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Abstract
Sub-sovereign public debt in Spain more than doubled over the period 2007-2011
leading to growing concerns on its sustainability and the potential negative spillovers
for general government public nance consolidation targets, in particular by rating
agencies and international organizations, in the context of the more general public
debt crisis suered by the euro area. Spain oers an interesting case study to under-
stand the fundamental determinants of sub-sovereign debt for a number of reasons.
Firstly, the country has witnessed successive waves of scal decentralization that have
increased the amount of public services provided directly by sub-national governments
in a framework of increased scal co-responsibility (scal autonomy). Secondly, this
decentralization process took place in a period in which a number of supra-national and
national scal rules were put in place in the country. Thirdly, while scal rules provide
some explicit coordination among the dierent levels of government, there is also a high
degree of market-imposed discipline, as most regional government's debt is regularly
scrutinized by rating agencies. Within this framework, we analyze the evolution and
the determinants of sub-sovereign public debt, focusing on regional government debt
determinants, including of liabilities accounted for outside the extant denition of EDP
public debt. Among the set of determinants we pay special attention to institutional
factors (scal decentralization, scal autonomy, scal rules) and market discipline. We
do so by estimating empirical models in which we exploit the pool structure of our
data (17 regions, over the period 1995-2010) within a GMM econometric approach.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of sub-national public debt developments has been growing in importance,
given the rising share of sub-national nance in the overall nancing needs of the general
government sector in a number of countries, and given the rising trend towards scal decen-
tralization (towards lower levels of government) all over the world (Canuto and Liu, 2010).
Within this framework, the analysis of the Spanish case is of relevance for a number of
reasons.
First, since the late 1970s Spain has become a highly decentralized country. The current
Spanish Constitution (1978), in its second article, recognizes the rights to self-government of
\regions and nationalities", within the Spanish nation. The 17 regional governments (\Co-
munidades Autonomas", CCAA henceforth) currently manage, among other competencies,
education (including universities), health and social services. In order to develop the Consti-
tutional mandate, the country has been subject over the past few decades to successive waves
of scal decentralization that have led to one of the strongest processes of scal decentraliza-
tion witnessed in the recent history in any developed country. Thus, in 2011, sub-national
governments (CCAA plus municipalities, AATT henceforth) managed some 50% of total
government expenditure, up from 35% in 1995 and a share below 20% in the early 1980s.
In parallel to expenditure decentralization, there has also been a process of increased scal
co-responsibility (scal autonomy).
Secondly, this decentralization process took place in a period in which a number of supra-
national and national scal rules were put in place in the country. In particular, under the
current legislation sub-national governments need prior authorization by the central govern-
ment on all its borrowing operations, while borrowing is banned on sub-national governments
that do not comply with their public decit targets and do not present { and commit to
{ scal adjustment plans. Over the last years these rules should have had to be applied
strictly in several occasions, thus providing a natural experiment framework suitable for em-
pirical testing.1 In addition, while there is some explicit coordination among the dierent
1As signalled in IMF (2011), in the decade leading up to the nancial crisis, the scal framework in
Spain appeared broadly adequate. In this respect, Spain scored in the top 5% group of countries covered by
the European Commission's index of scal rules' institutional strength. The institutional design included a
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levels of government on the application of scal rules aecting debt issuance, there is also a
high degree of market-imposed discipline, as central and most regional government's debt is
regularly scrutinized by rating agencies.
Third, Spain is the sixth sub-sovereign bond issuer world-wide, after the US, Germany,
Japan, China and Canada (see Canuto and Liu, 2010, Romeu, 2011). In the second quarter of
2012 total outstanding regional and local public debt amounted to some 187 bn euro (about
18% of Spanish GDP), of which some 36% was in the form of securities (other than shares).
Current debt levels are at historical highs, after sub-sovereign debt decreased steadily up to
2007Q4 to some 8% of GDP since its previous peak at 10.8% in 1997Q4. Thus, in the period
2007Q4 to 2012Q2, regional and local debt as a percent of GDP doubled, even though its
share of total public debt remained broadly stable over the same period. Given this sharp
increase in the nancing needs of these levels of government, an understanding of these
developments' determinants is warranted.
Fourth, Spain is the fourth biggest euro area economy by GDP weight (fth in the EU,
and 12th in the world-wide ranking), and is within the group that has been aected to
a greater extent by the sovereign-sovereign contagion induced by the so-called euro area
public debt crisis. Among other factors, it is now widely recognized that idiosyncratic
scal fundamentals have played and are still playing a role. In the latter respect, given the
sizeable share of public spending in the hands of CCAA and local governments (two-thirds
of overall public employment, 50% of total spending as mentioned before), mainly linked to
the provision of basic services, the later levels of government have been signalled as being a
potential obstacle to the successful achievement of the ambitious scal consolidation targets
the Spanish government is currently committed to comply.
Finally, Spains credibility in the bond markets has been hit at several moments over
the past year since the time of the regional and local elections held in May 2011 given
combination of EU-wide scal rules with national scal rules constraining public decits and public debt for
all the levels of the general government sector. Nevertheless such a framework was not able to prevent the
strong deterioration of public nances for all levels of the general government witnessed since the end of 2007
{ see Bank of Spain (2011) for a more general discussion on these issues{. One may wonder if irrespective
of the recent failure, the framework of national scal rules did exert a positive role in public debt control,
i.e. if in the absence of rules public nance outcomes would have been better or worse than envisaged.
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some concern on the possible existence of \hidden" public debt [...] likely to be revealed
by incoming regional and local administrations (see FT 16 May 2011). Even though the
numbers of concern rather than being \hidden" have been published regularly by the Bank
of Spain over the past decades, the point raised is worth some analysis, on political economy
grounded arguments. Public debt not considered with the EDP concept2 mainly comprises,
on the one hand, debt issued by companies controlled by local and subnational governments
and, on the other hand, accounts payable outstanding and commercial obligations. It would
be worth checking if these type of instruments have or have not been used by sub-national
governments to circumvent the constraints on debt issuance they are subject to (and that
only apply to conventional channels of nancing) as some political economy arguments would
suggest.
Against this framework, we study in this paper the evolution and the determinants of
sub-national's debt net nancing needs (measured by the change in public debt). While we
provide a descriptive and institutional analysis of the aggregate of sub-national governments
as a whole, we constraint ourselves in the main empirical part of the paper to the study of
the determinants of CCAA debt due to data constraints. We do so by estimating empirical
models in which we exploit the pool structure of our data (17 regions over the period 1995-
2010). Among the set of determinants we pay special attention to: (i) institutional factors,
such as scal decentralization and scal rules; (ii) market-disciple indicators, such as the
change in the implicit cost of debt and the structure of debt itself; (iii) non-EDP debt,
focusing on public corporations controlled by CCAA and its role in the determination of
CCAA's EDP debt. We nd that deeper scal decentralization, on the one hand, and, in
particular market-induced discipline, on the other, have been associated in the sample under
study with heightened scal discipline. We also nd a tight link between CCAA's EDP debt
and CCAA's public corporations debt.
In this paper we move beyond the available literature that analyzes the role of scal feder-
alism variables in the determination of regional public debt, mainly from a theoretical point
2EDP stands for Excessive Decit Procedure. Public debt is dened in the Protocol No. 12 on the
excessive decit procedure (EDP) annexed to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and in
Article 1(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009.
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of view, that in any case is related and precedes in certain respects our work. Contributions
along these lines are Valles (2002), that also includes and excellent survey of pre-2002 papers
on the issue, Lago-Pe~nas (2005), Argimon and Hernandez de Cos (2011) or Simon-Cosano
et al. (2012), among others.3
Our paper is organized as follows. In sections 2 to 4 we provide our rst contribution, of a
descriptive nature, including some descriptive data analysis and a detailed description of the
evolution of scal institutions in Spain. In this regards, in Section 2 we provide some stylized
facts on sub-sovereign public debt in Spain, while in Section 3 we describe the process of
scal decentralization in Spain since the early 1980s, as well as the changes in the nancing
arrangements between the Central government and the regional and local governments. On
related grounds in Section 4 we describe the evolution of scal rules aecting sub-national
levels of government in Spain. In Section 5, in turn, we perform the main empirical analysis
of the paper, covering rst the standard approach of papers on scal federalism, to move
to a deeper look at the role of scal rules and market discipline indicators, to end up with
some results on the link between regional EDP debt and regional public corporations' debt.
Finally, in Section 6 we provide some conclusions.
2 Some stylized facts on sub-sovereign public debt in
Spain
2.1 Some trends
Spanish General Government EDP debt increased in the period 2007Q1-2012Q2 more than
50 points of GDP. As can be seen in Figure 1 the increase in debt was visible in all the
subsectors of the General Government. In particular Central Government (AC) and Regional
Government debt (CCAA) moved from the pre-crisis values of 26.8 y 5.6 percent of GDP,
3The institutional determinants of local governments' indebtedness has been more widely analyzed in
the literature, mainly from a less aggregated-macro perspective than the standard in papers looking at the
determinants of CCAAs debt. See for example Cabases et al. (2007) or Bastida et al. (2001), and the
references quoted therein.
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respectively, to historical maxima of 58,3% and 14,2% of GDP, more than doubling their
registers in that period of time. Local governments' debt (CCLL) in turn, suered an increase
in their aggregate debt at the beginning of the crisis, but soon were able to stabilize their
levels of debt as a percent of GDP, maybe due to market or institutional constraints that
prevented them from following the rising trend of the other ublic administrations.
From a longer-term perspective, the pre-2007 period was one of substantial debt reduction
in the case of the AC, that halved its debt in the period 1996Q4 (local maximum) and 2007Q2.
Also the CCLL reduced their debt by some 35% in the same period, while the CCAAs only
saw their debt decrease by 10%. Thus, it is apparent from the chart that the economic
expansion period of the 1990s was used quite dierently by the dierent administrations to
reduce the 1990s-crisis-related debt hike.
In Figure 2, in turn, we display the evolution of other liabilities not covered by the
extant denition of EDP debt, namely the aggregates of public corporations' debt and other
accounts payable, also by subsectors of the General Government. Information on public
corporations' debt is publicly available for the period starting in 1995, for each regional
government but only for the aggregate of CCLL (and the AC), while data on Other Accounts
Payable is available only for the aggregates of each subsector (AC, CCAA, CCLL). In the
case of territorial governments (AATT = CCAA + CCLL) these non-EDP liabilities show
a somewht monotonic trend increase over the period 1995-2011, even though the absolute
numbers, at least from the aggregate General Government point of view, are not high in
comparative terms with the European Union (see Aspachs and Pina, 2012).
2.2 A standard decomposition of debt changes
It is worth looking at the evolution of debt in the period under scrutiny through the lens of
the government budget constraint. Let Yt be real GDP at t and let Dt be the real value of
government debt. The government budget constraint accounts for how a nominal interest
rate it, net ination t, net growth in real GDP, gdpt, the net-of-interest decit as a percent
of Yt, deft, and the decit-debt adjustment, DDAt combine to determine the evolution of
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the government debt-to-GDP-ratio,
Dt
Yt
=
1 + it
(1 + t) (gdpt)
Dt 1
Yt 1
+ deft +
DDAt
Yt
(1)
were the nominal yield it and the real stock of debt Dt are averages of pertinent objects
across terms to maturity. Its log-linearized version, suitable for accounting decomposition of
the fundamental determinants of debt, takes the form
Dt
Yt
= (it   t   gdpt) Dt 1
Yt 1
+
Dt 1
Yt 1
+ deft +
DDAt
Yt
(2)
With this decomposition at hand it is possible to analyze the determinants of changes in
the debt-to-GDP ratio. In Figure 3 we decompose these determinants for each year over the
period 1997-2011 for the General Government sector as a whole, for the aggregates of CCAA
and CCLL and, as a residual, for the aggregate of AC and Social Security. Focusing in a
rst stage in the period 1997-2007, the General Government primary balance contributed to
an average debt reduction of 2.3 percentage points per year, an amount similar in size to the
average contribution of real GDP (2.1 percentage points per year on average) and ination
(1.9 points per year on average). These three factor were partly compensated by an average
0.5 points per year debt-increasing contribution stemming from decit-debt adjustments,
and the interest payments, that amounted to some 2.8% of GDP per year on average. As
regards the 2008-2011 period, in the rst 3 years the sizeable increase in debt occurred in a
period of still benign interest rates dynamics, and was basically due to the worsened primary
balance, while the year 2011 combined the latter with adverse interest rate contributions.
This evolution of the General Government aggregate factors hides a dierentiated behav-
ior by subsectors, even though the average per-year contribution of the primary balance to
the change in debt was almost the same for the aggregates of AATT and AC (3.2 percent of
GDP vs 3.3). Dierences between the determinant of sub-national debt changes and national
debt changes pertain, rst, to the much elevated contribution of interest payments in the
case of the AC. In this respect it is worth mentioning that the scal decentralization process
in Spain was not accompanied by a parallel process of decentralization of the historical debt
burden, but that it was decided that the AC was to keep the inherited burden of debt. The
second dierentiated factor is the contribution of decit-debt adjustments that, in the case
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of the AATT, reduced their debt by 6.2 percent of GDP over the period 2008-2011 (-1.6%
on average per year), against the positive contribution of 5.9 percent of GDP in the case of
the AC. This can be explained by the application of the nancing arrangements between the
central government and the AATTs whereby the former agreed to postpone due payments
by the latter.
Figure 4, in turn, shows the same information as before, but cumulated, i.e. calculated
by means of equation:
Dt
Yt
=
 1X
s=0

(it s   t s   gdpt s) Dt s 1
Yt s 1
+ deft s +
DDAt s
Yt s

+
Dt+
Yt+
(3)
Between 1997 and 2007, the 31 percentage points of General Government debt reduction
can be break down as follows: (i) 25 percentage points of reduction due to the adjustment
of the primary balance; (ii) 22.6 points of reduction due to favorable real GDP growth;
(iii) 20.4 percentage points of reduction due to ination; (iv) these three factors more than
compensated the increase by 30.7 points due to the interest payments eected during the pe-
riod, and the 5.2 percentage points due to the decit-debt adjustments. The debt-increasing
contribution of the interest burden veils a favorable evolution of the implicit interest rate.
Interestingly, implicit interest rate dynamics, that averages interest rates of newly issued,
including renanced debt, and rates of non-maturing debt issued in the past, contributed
to contain the increase in the General Government debt ratio in 2008, 2009 and 2010, only
turning to a positive contribution in 2011, when rates at issuance increased substantially.
Beyond this latter factor, in the course of the four years that span from 2008 to 2011 the
abrupt reversal of all positive factors, most notably the signicant primary decits, undid
the results of the 1997-2007 consolidation period.
As apparent from the chart the substantial debt reduction process carried out since the
mid-1990s allowed to cushion the substantial increase of debt due to the recent crisis, insofar
as the cumulated change in debt since 1995 only turned out to be positive (increased of
debt) in 2011. In fact, the AC and CCLL debt burdens were still in 2011 below the mid-
1990s levels, in particular in the case of CCLL, while the case of the regional governments
is completely dierent. Indeed, from an aggregate point of view, the CCAAs reduced only
marginally their stock of debt in the period till 2007, with positive factors (real GDP growth
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and ination) broadly compensating over the period 1995-2007 the debt-increasing eect
of interest payments and, to a much lesser extent, primary decits. With the burst of the
most recent crisis, though, the latter equilibrium was broken and a signicant contribution
of public decits pushed public debt upwards.
Beyond the interest of the descriptive analysis in itself, one lesson that can be drawn from
the previous discussion is that changes in debt can be a preferred object of study vs budget
balances, as the former turned out to be a broader measure of net nancing needs and debt
accumulation, and also because decit-debt adjustments (stock-ow reconciliation) can be
arbitrarily large as in the period 2008-2011 { see also Campos et al., 2006 for an international
perspective.
2.3 The structure of sub-sovereign debt
The analysis of the structure of sub-sovereign debt can be instrumental to the analysis of
market-induced scal discipline. As shown in Figure 6 for the case of Regional debt, a number
of debt-structure ratios { namely, the ratio of short term to long term debt, the ratio of loans
to securities, and the ratio of loans by residents to those by non-residents { showed positive
(unconditional) correlations over the period 1995-2011 (quarterly data) with implicit interest
rate on overall regional debt. While the latter is not a perfect measure of the cost associated
with new debt issued, it is the only comprehensive measure of the cost of nancing available
and, in any case, its evolution should be a fair proxy of it.4 As shown in Figure 7, implicit
rates beneted from EMU accession, as discussed in the previous subsection, and decreased
more or less steadily for CCAA debt over 1995-2010, also in line with the implicit rates faced
by the Central Government. Local governments' aggregate implicit interest rate remained
anchor around some 2% over the whole period, with marked cyclical uctuations that were
particular marked in 2007 and 2008.
Traditionally, sub-central governments in Spain have relied more intensively on loans
rather than on securities as witnessed in Figure 5 (Panel 1), most noticeably in the case
of local entities whose ratio of loans-to-securities almost doubled between 2000 and 2011.
4The source of the debt data is the Bank of Spain. The source of interest payments' data is the IGAE.
Implicit interest rates are computed as the ratio of interest payments to overall debt.
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Regional governments managed to reduce in a steadily manner the ratio of loans-to-securities
from some 160% around 1995 to close to 80% by 2007. In that period, nevertheless, the ratio
showed some cyclical variation, a behavior that has been quite noticeable since the beginning
of the most recent crisis by mid 2007. Since then, the downward trend has been reversed,
and in 2012Q2 the stock of regional loans amounted to some 130% of the stock of regional
debt in the form of securities. A similar behavior is displayed by the ratio of short-term to
long-term sub-central debt, as can be seen in Figure 5, Panel 2.
Excessive reliance on a structure of debt leaned towards short-term instruments or easy-
to-access (\captive") markets (i.e loans by residents, in particular local banking systems,
vs securities in the market) might be a symptom of an increased perception of risk on the
part of investors. In particular, empirical studies have found short-term debt to be an
indicator of vulnerability to international nancial crises (Borensztein et al., 2004; Rodrick
and Velasco, 1999; Bussire and Mulder, 1999). Increased reliance on short-term debt may
make a government more vulnerable in a crisis framework, because of the need to rollover
increased amounts of debt. As signalled by Borensztein et al. (2004), in a case in which a
debt crisis mixes elements of illiquidity and insolvency, the government would be vulnerable
to a piece of bad news, whose real impact would be amplied by creditors' unwillingness to
roll over their claims (see also Jeanne, 2004). In addition, short-term debt introduces another
level of vulnerability for the scal accounts because interest payments would increase faster
the higher the fraction of short-to-long-term debt.
From an empirical point of view, in an economic and scal crisis episode, and in case
market access were not fully compromised, a shift in the composition of debt as reected by
increased ratios of short-to-long-term debt, on the one hand, and loans-to-securities, on the
other, might be expected. First, because these instruments might be the only ones available
to keep on covering nancing needs. Indeed, investors might be willing to hold short-term
debt even in a situation in which they assign a non-zero probability to default as they may
expect the sub-central government to repay them before the eventual default takes place.
Second, in the case of sub-central governments' debt, investors may expect that the central
government bails-out the administration under pressure, thus assigning to the default option
a low probability. In the case of Spain some studies suggest that there have been de facto
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bail-outs of regions by the center over the past decades (see Lago-Pe~nas, 2005; Sorribas,
2012). Third, as Missale et al. (1997) and Campbell (1995) argue, a government committed
to scal consolidation and debt stabilization may reduce the cost of debt servicing by issuing
short-term debt. This is the case in a framework of asymmetric information in which the
government and private investors do not share the same information (or perception) and thus
long-term debt instruments pay too high interest rates as a reection of credibility problems.
A government can thus issue short-term debt to signal its resolution to carry out its scal
consolidation plans.
3 The process of scal decentralization in Spain
As mentioned in the Introduction, Spain is currently one of the most decentralized countries
in the European Union. In particular, as described before, in 2010 close to 50% of general
government expenditure was carried out by subnational governments, with about 35% and
13% in the hands of regional governments and local governments, respectively (see Figure
8). This is the result of a gradual transfer of responsibilities for the management of specic
services from the Central Government to the CCAAs since the beginning of the 1980s. In
particular, subnational governments are currently responsible for close to 100% of public
expenditure on health care and education, and they manage a signicant part of other
expenditure functions.
The transfer of expenditure responsibilities from the Central Government to the CCAAs
has, however, neither come about at the same pace, nor have they been on the same scale in
all CCAAs.5 The main dierences concern the time at which the various CCAAs took over
education and health competencies. On the one hand, the regions that gained autonomy
through article 143 of the Spanish Constitution did not assume the respective management of
educational and health services until the 1990s and early twenty-rst century. On the other,
Andalusia, the Canary Islands, Catalonia, Galicia and the Valencia Community, along with
the Basque Country and Navarre, namely the regions that gained autonomy through article
151 of the Constitution and those with their own specic status due to their historical
5See Gordo and Hernndez de Cos (2003) for a review.
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jurisdiction (the so-called \Regimen Foral"), assumed health and education responsibilities
practically from the beginning of the 1980s.
In parallel to this process of devolution of expenditure responsibilities to the regions,
a nancing system for the subnational governments was also progressively developed (see
Figure 9). Again, the process was not completely homogeneous across regions. In particular,
a distinction should be drawn between the ordinary-regime RGs (all except the Basque
Country and Navarre), with limited scal autonomy, and the specic-status CCAAs (the
Basque Country and Navarre), which have full scal autonomy with the exception of customs
taris.6
The nancing arrangements for the ordinary-regime CCAAs have developed over time on
the basis of ve-year agreements. Initially, until the approval of the autonomy charters, the
administrative structures (pre-autonomous entities) of the CCAAs were nanced with Cen-
tral Government transfers. Subsequently, the transition period running from the approval
of the respective autonomy charters to the 1986 agreement saw the transfer of most powers
and the denition of nancing channels, in the main through Central Government transfers,7
supplemented with various taxes.8 The next nancing agreement (1987-1991) established a
more objective and automatic distribution system for Central Government transfers, with bi-
lateral Central Government/RG negotiations disappearing; and it broadened the assignment
of taxes to the regions to registration tax (\Impuesto sobre Actos Jurdicos Documenta-
6In essence, the Basque country provincial authorities (Alava, Guipuzcoa y Vizcaya) and the Navarre
RG have the power to maintain, establish and regulate, inside their territory, the tax regime, taking into
account some coordinating provisions established with the Central Government, which basically imply that
the eective overall tax burden arising from their regulatory power must not be lower than the existing
in the rest of the country. Accordingly, they are responsible for collecting all taxes except those included
in Customs Revenue and those raised through Fiscal Monopolies. As a consequence of the fact that the
taxes collected by these regions include almost all those existing but the State provides some services in
these regions (defense, diplomatic representation, etc.), the Basque Country and Navarre transfer some of
their resources, by means of the so-called \Cupo", to the Central Government in order to contribute to the
nancing of these services.
7Participation of the CCAAs in Central Government revenues and the Inter-Territorial Compensation
Fund.
8Taxes assigned by the Central Government, own taxes and surcharges on Central Government taxes.
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dos").9 The agreement for the 1992-1996 period continued to base the nancing of the
CCAAs essentially on the share in Central Government revenues. However, from 1994 it al-
lowed the Central Government to transfer fteen percent of the estimated territorial revenues
for personal income tax. This percentage was increased to thirty percent in the 1997-2001
agreement, but only at the end of the ve-year period, once the transfer of education-related
responsibilities was complete. This agreement also granted CCAAs regulatory powers over
their assigned taxes and over the tranche relating to shared personal income tax. The in-
crease in scal co-responsibility and in regulatory autonomy for the CCAAs was, however,
limited by the simultaneous establishment of a system of guarantees, which meant that the
minimum increase in nancing received by each RG would be equal to GDP growth, unless
the amendment of personal income tax rates or the setting of new deductions by the regions
were to bring about a loss of revenue in the RG tranche.
A new agreement came into force in 2002 that widened the CCAAs' tax resources. The
assigned percentage of personal income tax was raised to thirty three percent and, in addition,
thirty ve percent of net VAT revenues, forty percent of excise duties and 100 percent of the
tax on electricity, of a new tax on retail hydrocarbon sales and of the excise duty on specic
means of transport were all assigned. Furthermore, the new system extended the regulatory
powers of the CCAAs in relation to assigned taxes.10 Lastly, Central Government guarantees
as to the minimum growth of the nancial resources received by each RG were eliminated.11
The last reform of the nancing agreements of the CCAAs was approved at the end
of 2009, which resulted in additional resources for the regions. The new system raised
the amount of taxes transferred (to 50% in the case of the personal income tax and VAT;
9It also amended the Economic-Fiscal Regime for the Canary Islands, creating the Canary Islands General
Indirect Tax.
10The most signicant amendment was in personal income tax, since following this agreement the only
constraint on potential rate changes by CCAAs was that such changes had to be progressive and retain the
same number of brackets as was the case for the Central Government. Until then, limits were set in terms of
the variation in tax payable brought about by the change. Regulatory powers in respect of VAT and excise
duties were not granted, however, except in the case of the tax on specic means of transport, where CCAAs
have the power to change the rate within certain limits, and that of the new tax on hydrocarbons.
11With the exceptions of health spending in the rst three years in which the agreement was in force and
certain revenue-modulating rules.
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to 58% in the case of excise duties on manufactured production of alcohol, tobacco and
hydrocarbons)12 and CCAAs received additional powers to modify their rates in some of
these taxes.13 In addition, the criteria for distributing the dierent tax revenues and transfers
to the regions changed. As a result, and for the base year, each RG receive 25% of its tax
revenue, plus its participation in the so-called Guarantee Fund,14 plus its share on the so-
called Global Suciency Fund.15 16
Generally, then, it can be said that there has been a gradual increase in the CCAAs' scal
co-responsibility, meaning a progressive increase in the capacity of the CCAAs to depend
on their own tax and a parallel reduction in their dependence from State transfers. Above
all, this change is apparent from the late nineties and, in particular, from the 2002 nancing
agreement, which entailed an eective increase in the CCAAs' regulatory power of their
assigned taxes and the elimination of the State guarantees for revenue growth. Accordingly,
the CCAAs came to assume the risks of revenue losses associated with the assigned taxes.
In the case of local governments, the spending responsibilities assigned to them are regu-
lated by the Local Government Act of 1985, which establishes a minimum list of services to
be provided by them (the so-called compulsory services): the list of \compulsory services"
increases with population size.17 As a result, the nancing system of local governments also
12CCAAs keep the 100% collection of the hydrocarbon-oil retail sales, electricity tax, property and stamp
duty tax, tax of registration of motor vehicles, taxes on gaming, wealth tax and inheritance and gift tax.
13With the exception of the VAT, excise duties and electricity tax.
14This Fund is formed by the contribution of 75% of the tax revenues assigned to CCAAs plus some
additional fund added by the Central Government in the base year. Then the fund is distributed among
CCAAs on the basis of the weighted average of 7 variables, of which population related variables are the most
relevant. These variables are revised annually and the Central Government contribution to the guarantee
Fund is linked to the growth rate of the Central Government's tax revenues.
15For the base year, this fund is calculated for each RG as the dierence between their overall nancing
needs and the sum of their tax revenues and the transfer from the Guarantee Fund. In subsequent years,
the Guarantee Fund evolves with the growth rate of the Central Governments tax revenues.
16Two additional funds were created, of lower quantitative importance, the Competitiveness fund and the
Cooperation fund to promote regional income convergence.
17In particular, all local governments provide public lighting, street cleaning, refuse collection, water
supply, paving of local roads, food and drink control. Local governments with population > 5,000 provide
parks, libraries, marketplace, solid waste treatment. Local governments with population > 20,000 provide
re protection and emergencies, social services, sport facilities, slaughterhouse. Finally, local governments
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changes with size. In particular, under the current system that entered into force in 2004,
local governments revenues come from own taxes, property, fees and surcharges on central
and regional taxes, subsidies, regulated prices, nes and sanctions. In the case of local gov-
ernments that are capitals of a province or RG, or which have over 75,000 inhabitants, they
are also assigned a part of the personal income tax, VAT and taxes on alcohol, hydrocarbons
and tobacco.18
4 The scal rules framework aecting sub-national gov-
ernments in Spain
From the outset, sub-national governments were subject to some constraints and limitations
on their capacity to borrow and/or generate budget decits. In the case of the CCAAs,
they were empowered to take on debt, albeit subject to certain limits. Specically, credit
operations at less than one year must be used to cover temporary treasury requirements,
while credit operations at over one year, should meet the following requirements: (i) that
the total amount of the credit is earmarked for nancing investment spending; and (ii) that
the annual amount of debt repayments plus interest does not exceed twenty ve percent of
the CCAAs' current revenues. For the arrangement of credit operations abroad and for debt
issuance and any other resort to public credit, the CCAAs require the authorization of the
Central Government. In the same vein, local governments can nance current expenditure
considered as necessary and urgent but with certain limits; among others, these credits
should be lower than 5% of current budgetary revenues and interest payments should not be
higher than 25% of current revenues. Moreover, temporary treasury requirements of local
governments can be nanced with short-term debt, but with the limit of 30% of current
revenues. As in the case of CCAAs, credit operations at over one year should be earmarked
for nancing investment spending and interest payments cannot exceed twenty ve percent
with population > 50,000 include urban passenger transport, environmental protection under their spending
responsibilities. In any case, in most cases, local governments intervene voluntarily in the provision of services
even if they do not have the population size required (see Sole-Olle and Bosch, 2007).
18Between 1% and 2% depending on the tax and whether it is a municipal or provincial one.
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of current revenues of the local government. 19
CCAAs' credit operations should be coordinated among the CCAAs themselves and in
keeping with the Central Governments debt policy, with the CCAAs obliged to submit an
annual debt programme to the government. Once the programme has been agreed, it entails
the automatic authorization of all the operations contained therein. The application of
the programme may be changed by a CCAA following a new proposal to the government.
Further, the Central Government itself may suspend the programme on a precautionary basis
should there be exceptional circumstances that might hamper the Treasury's nancial policy
or involve imbalances in the relationship between the level of external and domestic debt.
Again, in the case of local governments certain credit operation at over one year require
authorization by the Central Government.
From 1992, following the publication in March of Spain's Convergence Programme, the
so-called Budgetary Consolidation Scenarios (BCS) were signed by the Central Government
and each of the CCAAs, further to bilateral negotiations, in which an specic maximum
decit and debt allowed for each RG were determined. In March 1995, further to the revision
of the Convergence Programme in July 1994, the commitments contained in the BCS were
also revised, and the ceilings for the period 1995-1997 were specied. These were changed
once again following the approval of the rst Stability and Growth Programme in December
1998.
The budgetary stability law that came into force in 2002 set a single limit for all CCAAs,
though not in terms of debt but rather in terms of the budget balance, where under the
CCAAs and local governments must meet the principle of budgetary stability, dened as
the need to post a budget outturn that is in balance or surplus. This law also dened the
scheme of sanctions that may be imposed in the event of non-compliance to the CCAAs.20
The law also provided that, in authorizing the arrangement of credit operations abroad and
19Latter in 1999 this limit was dened as total debt over one year not being allowed to be higher than
110% of total revenues. In 2010, and only for that year this percentage was increased to 125%, and in 2011
was reduced to 75%.
20Specically, it states that if the CCAAs do not meet the obligations established under the law and if
this leads, in turn, to non-compliance with the obligations of the Stability and Growth Pact, the CCAAs
shall assume, in the portion attributable to them, the responsibilities arising from their conduct.
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the issuance of debt and any other resort to public credit, the Central Government shall bear
in mind compliance with the principle of budgetary stability.
A reform of the budgetary stability law was approved in May 2006, which entered into
force on 1 January 2008, enabling the Central Government and CCAAs to adapt their decit
and surplus targets to the economys cyclical position. Specically, it allows the CCAAs (local
governments21) to run a decit of 0.75 (0.05) percent of GDP if economic growth is below a
certain threshold, to which a further 0.25 (0.05) percent of GDP may be added to nance
increases in productive investment. It likewise establishes that a signicant portion (in no
case less than thirty percent) of investment programmes shall be nanced with gross saving
of the CCAA in question, with only partial resort to debt being permitted. In addition
to the extension of the scal rules to the lower tiers of government, the BSL has a clause
that says that the State shall not take responsibility for the nancing of the decits or
public debt of the lower levels of government (no bail-out clause). Lastly, it stipulated that,
if a deviation from targets prompts a breach of the Stability and Growth Pact, the tier
of government involved shall assume the attendant proportion of the responsibilities that
should arise from the breach. In addition, in the case of the regional governments and
municipalities, compliance shall be taken into account in the States authorization of credit
operations and debt issues. Specically, if the failure to meet the stability target takes the
form of a greater-than targeted decit, all the regional governments debt operations shall
require State authorization.
Finally, a constitutional reform was approved in September 2011 that enshrines in the
Constitution the obligation for all levels of government to adjust their conduct to the principle
of budgetary stability. The reform was followed by the approval of a new Law in 2012 that
details that the general government decit in structural terms cannot exceed 0.4% of GDP,
sets a limit on government debt of 60% of GDP22 (both of which should be achieved following
a transition period up to 2020) and an expenditure rule. In the case of local governments,
however, they should keep a balance or surplus position and it is not allowed a decit in
21Specically, those that are provincial or regional capitals, or that have a population equal to or higher
than 75,000 inhabitants. The rest of local governments should keep a balance or surplus position in any case.
22The 60% debt to GDP limit is distributed: 44% of GDP for the Central Government; 13% for all and
each of CCAAs and 3% of local governments.
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structural terms. Moreover, the no bail-out clause is maintained and the law includes new
instruments to guarantee compliance with budgetary targets by all levels of government
(including sanctions), the automatic adjustment of regional government spending and, if
need be, central government intervention in regional and local government budgets.
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Data and hypotheses to be tested
Control variables: economic factors In line with the extant literature, we include in
our analysis economic, political and institutional that may be instrumental in explaining the
change in CCAAs over time. In this section, as regards economic, political and institutional
factors, we follow closely the denitions and variables of Argimon and Hernandez de Cos
(2011).
As regards economic factors, economic theory has highlighted the economic cycle as a
fundamental determinant, rst, of budget balances. In economic downturns budget decits
increase, either through the operation of automatic stabilizers or though the impact of coun-
tercyclical discretionary scal policies designed to stabilize the economy, while the opposite
occurs in expansions. In addition to the impact of debt accumulation though the ow of
yearly decits/surpluses, economic growth erodes the stock of public debt when measured
as a percent of GDP. In fact, even high debt ratios can be sustainable in a framework of
healthy economic growth, while in a situation of low or negatie growth even low debt ratios
can turn out to be non-sustainable. We include in our analysis the yearly growth rate of each
CCAA GDP as a measure of the economic cycle (variable Economic cycle), taken from the
Annual Regional Accounts published by the Spanish Statistical Oce (INE). Among the set
of economic factors, we also include as control variable a measure of the degree of economic
development, as measured by per capita income.
Another relevant economic factor behind debt accumulation is the evolution of prices, as
prescribed by the government budget constraint. Here the literature usually distinguishes
between asset prices, that may aect scal outcomes basically through the tax system (taxes
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on capital gains and losses, taxes on transaction, and tax relief, in particular, in the Spanish
case, for house purchases). In the case of Spain, nancial and nonnancial assets form the
basis of certain taxes managed and collected by CCAAs. Available information for variables
that could capture asset prices at the regional level is scarce. Because of its relevance in
the boom period (1995-2007) and its availability, housing prices might be a good proxy to
capture the incidence of assets on regional public nances. We dene a variable as follows:
deviation of the change in each region's index of housing prices with respect to the national
mean.
More generally, overall ination is a factor typically advocated to have an impact on
debt, both indirectly through its eect on tax revenues and directly through its deating
eect on the debt-to-GDP ratio. The incidence of price changes (measured by the change
sin the CPI) will be captured by a variable dened as the deviation of each region's ination
in relation with the national mean, in such a way that possible common trends are taken
care of.
Control variables: political and institutional factors The literature has proved that
it is necessary to include political and institutional factors in the standard analysis (typically
focused on the study of budget balances) to be able to explain the persistence of budget
decits and the accumulation of debt in advanced economies. In our analysis we include a
number of political variables: (i) ideology, measured, rst, by the % of left-wing MPs over
the total seats of regional parliaments, and second, by the percent of regionalist parties'
MPs (parties that only operate in a given region, and do form part explicitly or implicitly,
of national party) over the total number of seats of the regional parliament; (ii) dummy to
measure the political concordance of the center and the periphery (region), a measure of
political alignment between the government of a given region and the central government;
(iii) electoral cycle, measure by an elections variables (distance-to-electoral-year).
Most importantly, we include a number of dummy variables measuring the strength of
scal rules: (i) European Commission Fiscal Rules Index; (ii) dummy variables for the
dierent regimes of rules, more specically the above-mentioned Budgetary Consolidation
Scenarios (BCS) and Budgetary Stability Law (BSL) of 2002, leaving aside the most recent
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BSL because it only entered into force in 2011.
Control variables: scal federalism The territorial organization of a country has also
been signalled by the extant literature as a further determinant of the scal situation, either
measured by the scal balance or by the stock of debt. In particular, the responsibilities
assumed by the regions, the instruments for nancing them, and the relationships between
regional and central governments are all factors that certainly aect the aggregate scal
outcomes of a given country and, more specically, the distribution of scal outcomes among
the dierent layers of government. In particular, the literature has devoted some eort to
the existence of a so-called soft budget constraint problem whereby a subnational government
may have incentives to conduct an undisciplined scal policy under the expectation that the
central government will intervene in case of trouble (see Qian and Roland, 1998; Kornai et
al., 2003; Sorribas, 2012).
Following the literature we include in our analysis the following variables within this
particular group: (i) scal co-responsibility (measured by the ratio of taxes over which the
regions do have normative power, over their total non-nancial revenues); (ii) an alternative
way of capturing the impact on regional public nances of the changes experienced in the
level of scal co-responsibility is to create directly dummies for the nancing arrangements
between the center and the regions that took place over the period, as described above
(1992-1996, 1997-2001, 2002-2009).23
Control variables: market discipline and endogenous control mechanisms Be-
yond the factors analyzed in the previous paragraphs, the ability to increase debt by a given
level of administration is fully determined by its ability to raise the necessary funds. In
addition to increasing taxes or decreasing expenditure, the latter necessarily entails nding
(national or international) investors willing to buy the debt of a given administration. Thus
one may conjecture that market pressure might be a key determinant of the change in public
23We also included in the analysis dummies to account for the dierent degrees of devolution of each
regional (\forales" and article 151 vs the rest). Nevertheless, this type of time-invariant dummies turned out
to be immaterial for the econometric estimation insofar as the latter will be carried out in rst dierences,
as will be explained below.
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debt.
To approach the inuence of market discipline, either directly or through the induced
eect on the endogenous reaction of governments to built up the sucient credibility not
to lose market access, we explore the following control variables: (i) budgetary deviation
in the previous period - one may expect that under market pressure, a given deviation
from the budgetary target in year t-1 tends to be at least partially corrected in year t; in
this respect we include a variable dened as the dierence between the projected budget
balance (initial budget) and the observed balance, both as a ratio of total (projected and
observed, respectively) revenues; (ii) change in the implicit interest rate, as a measure of
market pressure; (iii) a number of variables linked to the composition of debt, as follows.
On the one hand, the ratio of short-to-long run debt. Short-term debt could be associated
with the reaction to sudden changes in market sentiment. In a framework of worsened
perception about a given sovereign, though, increased reliance on short-term debt can lead
to a heightened vulnerabilities, as worsening perceptions of a given region's creditworthiness
can quickly feed into higher interest costs (see also IMF, 2004). On the other hand, the
ratio of securities to loans, with the prior in mind that loans could be more easily obtained
in somewhat \captive" markets vs open competition to capture investors in securities. In
the particular case of the regions of Spain, regional Savings Banks (\Cajas de ahorros")
typically assumed a role as CCAAs bankers. Finally, the ratio of debt held by non-resident
vs that held by residents, might be also a measure of stress in the markets as, a priori, in
the case of undisciplined governments that are perceived as pursuing unsustainable scal
policies, non-residents tend to react more quickly and shift portfolios towards more secure
assets than residents.
Control variables: pressure from units accounted for outside the boundaries
of the General Government sector In particular, within this group, we consider the
dynamics of the debt of public corporations owned by a given region (non-EDP) over the
EDP debt of that very region. Indeed, the related literature would suggest that: (i) under
tight budgetary rules a government may try to circumvent the constraints by cutting transfers
public corporations that, in turn, can nance the same spending by issuing debt that is not
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computed by means of the same accounting standards used to dene the rule (typically as
in National Accounts); (ii) an excessive level of non-EDP debt may end up creating pressure
on the government to bail-out the external indebtedness vehicle.
5.2 The empirical model
The empirical analysis is carried out using the available annual data for the period 1995-
2010. The incidence of the dierent determinants on the changes in public debt mentioned
in the previous section will be tested by means of a standard econometric model that can be
specied in quite general terms as:

Dit
Yit
= i +
NX
j=1
j 
jit + it (4)
Under the proposed approach, the change in public debt of each regional government,i, at
time t, Dit
Yit
, depends on a set of control variables, 
, encompassing the economic, political,
institutional, market-induced and non-EDP factors mentioned above. Following the tradi-
tional xed-eects model, i in equation (4) aims at capturing all the unobservable CCAA
eects that are time-invarying, while it is an error term assumed to be white noise.
As for the estimation method, and in order to avoid any biases stemming from the possible
correlation between the individual eects and the regressors, we estimate the level model in
rst dierences. Moreover, given the possible simultaneity of some of the control variables
and the dependent variable, the estimation is carried out by the Generalized Method of
Moments (Arellano and Bond, 1991), using as instruments lagged regressors. Under GMM,
the assumption that in the model in levels the error term is white noise implies that the
rst dierence specication will have a 1-order moving average structure in the residuals.
Therefore, for the endogenous variables the acceptable instruments are their own lagged
values for two or more periods. For these instruments to be appropriate, it is required that
the error term is white noise, which requires in turn that the residuals do not show second-
order serial correlation in the equation estimated in rst dierences. The statistic m2 is
asymptotically distributed as a normal, and it is used to test for this hypothesis (null of no
autocorrelation). We also present the results of the Sargan test, a test of overidentication
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restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a 2.
5.3 Results
The results are shown in tables , , and .
In Table we explore the role of more traditional factors, namely scal federalism variables
and standard measures of scal rules, controlling for economic and political determinants.
In Table , in turn, we expand the analysis of the role of scal rules by focusing on a number
of interactions of scal rules' variables with \vulnerability" or market-pressure variables.
As regards, Table , we study in detail the eect of dierent measures of market discipline,
while in Table we consider the bi-directional inuence between the debt (non-EDP) of public
corporations controlled by CCAA and CCAA's EDP debt.
As regards a detailed reading of Table , we show the estimations of three models, all of
which consider the same macroeconomic and political factors, persistence of changes in debt
(\lagged dependent variable"), the level of debt in the previous period24, and the budgetary
deviation incurred in t   1 with respect to the initial budget. The three columns dier,
though, on the scal co-responsibility proxies used and/or the type of proxy for scal rules
used. The following results of Table are worth highlighting: (i) As regards the impact of the
economic cycle, the estimations in columns [1], [2] and [3] point to a debt-reducing eect
whereby an additional 1% of real GDP growth in a given period would be associated with
a reduction of debt of some 0.2 percent of GDP. This number is not far from standard
sensitivities of the public decit (an imperfect, though fair measure of the change in debt)
to the state of the business cycle. (ii) The variable measuring ination deviations presents
a negative sign, even though the coecients are estimated with low precision and thus only
in one case the estimates turn out to be dierent from zero in statistical terms. A negative
sign means that ination is conductive to reducing, when signicant, public debt. This is
consistent with the expected direct, deating eect on the stock of debt. At the same time,
one may think of this factor as in Argimon and Hernandez de Cos (2011), whereby the extra
tax revenue obtained through the absence of tax indexation in the Personal Income Tax
24For a given regions, one may expect that the larger the level of debt, the more dicult would be to
increase debt in a subsequent period.
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in the Spanish case seem to fully oset the additional costs associated with rising prices,
which are channeled through expenditure as a result of the automatic indexation of certain
spending items. (iii) the level of development (measured by GDP per capita deviations of
each region with respect to the national mean) seems to be also associated, on average, with
less accumulation of debt. (iv) Within the political variables, only the one that measures
the fraction of regionalist parties' MPs is signicant in a robust way, and indicates that
regions with more regionally-oriented political rules tend to accumulate more debt, maybe
because of the need to nance extra goods and services for their citizens, related to a higher
preference for autonomy. (v) The scal co-responsibility index presents the expected sign,
but it is not signicant in any of the empirical specications; on the contrary, the set of
dummies measuring the dierent nancing arrangements between regions and the center are
strongly signicant and present the expected negative sign. Interestingly, the coecients
associated to each dummy are higher the more recent the nancing arrangement, a result
that is in line with the standard result of the scal federalism literature that a higher degree
of scal co-responsibility tends to be associated with increased scal discipline. (vi) Finally,
it is worth mentioning that the \endogenous" stress variables, namely, the lagged level of
debt and the budgetary deviations incurred in the previous year (known in the current year)
are both conductive to, on average, reduce debt in the subsequent year.
The measures of scal rules in Table are either non-signicant or show (model [3]) the
\wrong" sign. One may try to nd a theoretical justication to a positive coecient for
FRI, on the grounds that too strict scal rules may not be credible ex-ante and thus end
up being associated with a less disciplined approach to scal outcomes than other type of
(implicit, market-based) rules. Nevertheless, the weak evidence for this in the table does not
allow to put forward this point as a suciently robust one. On related grounds, in Table
we further explore the role of scal rules, by interacting FRI with a number of variables.
Interestingly, when FRI is interacted with the budgetary deviation variable, the result is
negative (conductive to scal discipline) and strongly signicant in the six alternative models
shown. In addition, when interacted with a direct measure of scal discipline, the implicit
interest rate, the sign is also negative, while in this case the coecient is close-to-borderline
signicant, although not at the usual levels. The interaction of FRI with the ratio of short-
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to-long term debt is also interesting: an increase in the reliance on short term debt vs
long-term debt can indicate, according with the theoretical arguments outlined in a previous
section, that a government committed to living-up to the rules (interaction with FRI) can
keep market access through the short-end of the portfolio available. As regards the FRI times
securities over loans ratio, the negative and signicant sign may indicate that a government
with more market (competitive) access (i.e. with an increase in the ratio of securities to
loans) tend to be more stability-oriented.
Table digs deeper on the role of market-discipline-related variables, not necessarily linked
to their interaction with FRI. The following additional results in this table can be underlined:
(i) increases in the implicit interest rate seem to be strongly associated with increased scal
disciplined (debt reductions). A close to 1% increase in the implicit rate would lead by itself
to a reduction of debt by 0.1 percent of GDP25; (ii) as mentioned in the previous paragraph,
provided that market access is not lost, regional governments nd it feasible to increase their
debt levels by relying more on short-term debt (in relative terms to long-term instruments);
thus, market pressure that forces a given government to issue more short-to-long term debt
does not induce a more disciplined scal behavior of those governments provided they can
nance themselves with this new debt structure more biased to short-term instruments.; (iii)
the ratio of securities over loans presents a negative sign in all specications (signicant at
the usual condence levels only in two) reinforcing the idea that regional governments with
better access to less \captive" investors (those buying securities) tend to be more disciplined
from the scal point of view.
Finally, in Table we show, as mentioned before, the linkages between regional govern-
ments' EDP debt and their public corporations' (EEPP) debt. Columns [1] to [3] show in a
robust way that the lagged level of public corporations' (EEPP) debt as a percent of nominal
GDP tend to anticipate increases in EDP debt. At the same time, the changes in both types
of debt tend to be positively correlated (positive sign of EEPPdebt, with a paralel result in
columns [4] to [6]) even though lagged increases of EEPPdebt would anticipate a decrease
ofEDPdebt. Trying to square all these results, one may claim that EEPP debt contains
information on the future evolution of EDP debt, whereby an excessive accumulation of
25Please notice that the variable in the table is multiplied by 10.
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EEPP debt ends up inducing an upward pressuer on within-the-EDP-boundaries debt.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we study the evolution and the determinants of sub-national's debt net nanc-
ing needs (measured by the change in public debt). While we provide a descriptive and
institutional analysis of the aggregate of sub-national governments as a whole, we constraint
ourselves in the main empirical part of the paper to the study of the determinants of CCAA
debt due to data constraints.
The main results of the empirical models in which we exploit the pool structure of our
data (17 regions over the period 1995-2010) are as follows. First, institutional factors, such
as scal decentralization and scal rules play a limited role, even though standard results
in the literature are conrmed. Second, market-disciple indicators, such as the change in
the implicit cost of debt, the structure of debt itself, and measures of induced self-discipline,
play a signicant role in disciplining regional governments attitude towards increasing debt.
Third, the debt (non-EDP) of public corporations controlled by CCAA play a role in the
determination of CCAA's EDP debt.
All in all, we nd that deeper scal decentralization, on the one hand, and, in particular
market-induced discipline, on the other, have been associated in the sample under study
with heightened scal discipline. We also nd a tight link between CCAA's EDP debt and
CCAA's public corporations debt.
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Table 1: The determinants of regional governments' debt changes (changes as a percent of
GDP): baseline models.
Dependent variable:  EDP debt [1] [2] [3]
Lagged dependent variable 0.160 c 0.170 c 0.181 c
(0.096) (0.099) (0.101)
Economic cycle -0.219 a -0.215 a -0.203 a
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Ination deviation -0.211 -0.200 -0.311 c
(0.186) (0.178) (0.181)
GDP per capita deviation -0.206 c -0.203 c -0.118
(0.115) (0.120) (0.112)
Housing ination deviation 0.008 0.007 0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
% Left-wing parties MPs -0.005 -0.007 -0.012
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013)
% Regionalist parties' MPs 0.032 b 0.035 b 0.025 c
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015)
Concordance centre-periphery 0.087 0.088 0.140
(0.168) (0.167) (0.167)
Elections 0.005 0.004 0.031 c
(0.024) (0.025) (0.018)
Fiscal corresponsibility -0.001 -0.046 -
(0.040) (0.034)
Financing agreement - - -1.170 a
1992-1996 (0.400)
Financing agreement - - -1.333 a
1997-2001 (0.332)
Financing agreement - - -1.966 a
2002-2009 (0.253)
Fiscal rules: BCS 0.088 - -
(0.144)
Fiscal rules: BSL -0.170 - -
(0.208)
Fiscal rules index (FRI) - -0.003 0.049 c
(0.018) (0.027)
Budgetary deviation (t-1) -0.197 c -0.178 c -0.285 a
(0.010) (0.105) (0.100)
EDP debt (t-1) -0.244 a -0.231 a -0.154 b
(0.834) (0.081) (0.070)
Number of observations 238 238 254
a, b, c: signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
29
Table 2: The determinants of regional governments' debt changes (changes as a percent of
GDP): scal rules.
Dependent variable:  EDP debt [1] [2] [4] [5] [5] [6]
Lagged dependent variable 0.202 b 0.177 b 0.219 a 0.211 a 0.219 a 0.214 a
(0.080) (0.082) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.069)
Economic cycle -0.177 a -0.184 a -0.189 a -0.189 a -0.190 a -0.190 a
(0.017) (0.019) (0.024) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
% Regionalist parties' MPs 0.034 b 0.032 b 0.036 b 0.036 b 0.035 b 0.037 b
(0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Elections 0.016 0.012 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.017
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023)
Fiscal corresponsibility -0.006 c -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Fiscal rules index (FRI) 0.013 - - - - -
(0.018)
Fiscal rules: BCS - 0.157 0.148 0.119 0.161 0.146
(0.129) (0.131) (0.127) (0.128) (0.129)
Fiscal rules: BSL - -0.009 0.047 0.016 0.031 0.072
(0.221) (0.219) (0.204) (0.216) (0.241)
Budgetary deviation (t-1) -0.105 -0.128 - - - -
(0.101) (0.101)
EDP debt (t-1) -0.205 a -0.219 a -0.241 a -0.238 a -0.231 a -0.233 a
(0.072) (0.074) (0.077) (0.069) (0.081) (0.079)
FRI x Budgetary deviation -0.222 a -0.230 a -0.030 a -0.024 a -0.298 a -0.296 a
(0.072) (0.070) (0.008) (0.007) (0.084) (0.082)
FRI x Short/long 0.076 a 0.075 a - 0.077 a - -
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017)
FRI x Securities / Loans -0.013 -0.018 - - -0.021 c -
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
FRI x Non-residents/residents -0.006 -0.003 - - - -0.006
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
FRI x Implicit interest rate -0.405 -0.299 -0.286 -0.374 -0.241 -0.292
(0.268) (0.259) (0.260) (0.270) (0.263) (0.261)
Number of observations 238 238 238 238 238 238
a, b, c: signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Control variables included in the regressions but not shown for the sake of simplicity:
Ination deviation, GDP per capita deviation, Housing ination deviation, % Left-wing
parties MPs, Concordance centre-periphery.
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Table 3: The determinants of regional governments' debt changes (changes as a percent of
GDP): market discipline.
Dependent variable:  EDP debt [1] [2] [4] [5] [5] [6]
Lagged dependent variable 0.28 b 0.22 b 0.29 a 0.23 a 0.33 a 0.26 a
(0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
Economic cycle -0.22 a -0.23 a -0.21 a -0.22 a -0.21 a -0.23 a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
% Regionalist parties' MPs 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 c 0.00 0.03 c
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Elections 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Fiscal co-responsibility 0.01 c 0.01 c 0.01 0.01 c 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Fiscal rules: BCS -0.12 -0.13 -0.11 -0.04 -0.11 -0.01
(0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14)
Fiscal rules: BSL -0.23 -0.28 -0.23 -0.30 -0.22 -0.28
(0.16) (0.20) (0.16) (0.19) (0.16) (0.22)
EDP debt (t-1) - -0.16 c - -0.22 a - -0.24 a
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
 Implicit interest rate -0.90 b -0.92 b -0.96 b -0.92 b -1.03 b -0.94 b
(0.42) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.47) (0.46)
Ratio short/long term debt 0.10 b 0.15 a 0.18 a 0.18 a - -
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
 Ratio short/long term debt 0.082 b 0.042 - - - -
(0.033) (0.037)
Ratio Securities / Loans -0.27 b -0.05 -0.16 b -0.14 - -
(0.12) (0.23) (0.06) (0.13)
 Ratio Securities / Loans 0.104 0.027 - - - -
(0.073) (0.120)
Ratio debt non-residents / residents -0.02 -0.01 - - -0.03 b -0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
 Ratio non-residents / residents -0.013 -0.011 - - - -
(0.016) (0.018)
Number of observations 221 221 238 238 238 238
a, b, c: signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Control variables included in the regressions but not shown for the sake of simplicity:
Ination deviation, GDP per capita deviation, Housing ination deviation, % Left-wing
parties MPs, Concordance centre-periphery.
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Table 4: The determinants of regional governments' debt changes (changes as a percent of
GDP): public corporations owned by regional governments.
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
 EDP debt  EEPP debt
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Lagged dependent variable 0.18 b 0.14 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.18 c
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
Economic cycle -0.22 a -0.20 a -0.21 a -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
% Regionalist parties' MPs 0.03 c 0.00 0.03 b -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Elections 0.02 0.04 c 0.04 b -0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Fiscal co-responsibility 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fiscal rules: BCS 0.13 -0.02 0.11 -0.05 b -0.08 b -0.06 c
(0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Fiscal rules: BSL -0.33 -0.20 -0.32 c 0.10 0.12 0.10
(0.22) (0.12) (0.17) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
EDP debt (t-1) -0.26 a - -0.22 0.00 0.02 0.02
(0.08) (0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
EEPP debt (t-1) 0.61 a 0.76 a 0.82 a -0.19 - -0.41 a
(0.21) (0.16) (0.18) (0.00) (0.06)
 EEPP debt - 0.36 b 0.44 a - - -
(0.15) (0.15)
 EEPP debt (t-1) - -0.46 c -0.39 c - - -
(0.27) (0.21)
 EDP debt - - - - 0.02 c 0.07 a
(0.01) (0.01)
 EDP debt (t-1) - - - - -0.01 0.02
(0.05) (0.05)
Number of observations 238 221 221 221 221 221
a, b, c: signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Control variables included in the regressions but not shown for the sake of
simplicity: Ination deviation, GDP per capita deviation, Housing ination
deviation, % Left-wing parties MPs, Concordance centre-periphery.
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Figure 1: The evolution of General Government EDP debt in Spain, by subsectors of the
General Government.
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Figure 2: Other liabilities not included in the extant denition of Government EDP debt,
by subsectors of the General Government.
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Figure 3: The determinants of changes in General Government EDP debt (as a percent
of GDP) in the period 1995-2011, by subsectors of the General Government: year-by-year
changes.
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Figure 4: The determinants of changes in General Government EDP debt (as a percent
of GDP) in the period 1995-2011, by subsectors of the General Government: cumulative
changes.
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Figure 5: The breakdown of subnational EDP debt by type of debt (loans vs securities), and
by maturity (short-run vs long-run).
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Figure 6: Regional governments' debt: vulnerability indicators.
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Figure 7: Implicit interest rates on Spanish government debt, by subsectors of the General
Government.
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Figure 8: Subnational government revenues. Percentage of general government revenues in
2010. Source: European Commission.
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Figure 9: Subnational government expenditures. Percentage of general government expen-
ditures in 2010. Source: European Commission.
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